Organic crosstalk or intercommunication among different organs is an interesting medical concept based on the biosemiotic perspective which considers the organism as a process maintained by the vital information flow between structural plane and biosemiotic plane, both with their different layers of biological complexity. From this point of view the organ is not merely the structure which produces crosstalk but just as much its product. The crosstalk perspective seeks two main goals: to investigate the characteristic serum biosemiotic patterns of pathogenic (...) organic crosstalk in order to achieve early diseases diagnosis, and to learn how to correct it. These achievements could allow physicians to evolve from a medical practice that focuses on misbiosemiotic effects, diagnosing and treating damaged organs, to a medical practice that focuses on misbiosemiotic processes, in this way diagnosing and treating pathogenic organ crosstalk before it culminates in organ damage. (shrink)

From an epistemological viewpoint, the Forms constitute the objects of true knowledge. From an ontological point of view, they are the principles that underlie the order of the universe.

Anticipating the fifth centennial of Vives’ birth in 1992, this is the first comprehensive study of two of Vives’ main works, De Anima et Vita, Book 3 and De Prima Philosophia, accompanied by the first general biography based on recent research. Juan Luis Vives was a Spanish sixteenth-century humanist who spent most of his life as an exile in England and the Low Countries. De Anima et Vita, the third book of which makes up the tract on emotions, represents the (...) culmination of Vives’ effort to understand human nature. Noreña has organized Vives and the Emotions into three parts. Part one incorporates recent research on Vives and corrects some of the inaccuracies of Noreña’s 1970 Luis Vives. He provides expanded accounts of Vives’ attitude toward Erasmus and religion, his reaction to terminist logic, his social and legal views, and his contributions to Renaissance pedagogy. The second part of the book examines in detail one of Vives’ most philosophical and forgotten tracts, a lengthy summary of his metaphysical views published in 1531 under the title De Prima Philosophia seu de Intimo Naturae Opificio, which is probably the most speculative of Vives’ works. Part three compares Vives’ thoughts on emotion to those of Aristotle, some ancient Stoic sources, Saint Thomas, Descartes, and Spinoza, while dividing the entire material under such headings as the nature, the classification, the interaction, and the therapeutic control of emotion. (shrink)

Starting from the first centenary of Carlo Cattaneo's birth in 1901, the Author reviews the publication of his works in concomitance with the interpretation and diffusion of his thinking. From the first ample collection of writings, down to Bertani and other friends, to the anthology by Gaetano Salvemini, from Alessandro Levi's monograph to the interpretations of Norberto Bobbio and Luigi Ambrosoli, the article shows the interweaving between the exegesis and the piecing together of Cattaneo's dispersed works, the complete retrieval of (...) which is being undertaken by the Italo-Swiss Committee set up in 1946. It ends with the new national edition of his works, which on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his death in 2019 saw the publication of the fourth volume of his Lettere, the eighth volume in the entire collection. (shrink)

Wie sich die Augen der Nachteule zum Tageslicht verhalten, so die Vernunft unserer Seele zu dem was, seiner Natur nach am offenbarsten ist. Dieser Vergleich des Aristoteles am Anfang der Metaphysik (II, 993b9-11) hat in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie Anlass gegeben zu verschiedenen Interpretationen. Was hier zur Diskussion steht, ist die Frage, ob dem Menschen eine Erkenntnis dessen moglich ist, was sich der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung entzieht. Kann der Geist, der mit dem Korper verbunden ist, die substantiae separatae erkennen, die ersten Ursachen (...) dieser Welt, die selbst diese physische Ordnung uberschreiten. Es ist die scholastische Version der modernen Frage nach der Moglichkeit der Metaphysik. In dieser Lectio Albertina untersucht Carlos Steel am Beispiel der Interpretation des Nachtvogel-Gleichnisses, wie unterschiedlich Thomas und Albert die Frage nach der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlage der Metaphysik beantwortet haben. Die Differenz zwischen beide Positionen wird auch die spatere Diskussion bis in die Renaissance kennzeichen. (shrink)

CHAPTER THE VICISSITUDES OF VIVES' FAME During his life and in the first hundred years after his death (-) Vives enjoyed tremendous prestige. ...

En este artículo se ofrece una defensa del libertarismo frente a dos acusaciones según las cuales éste comete un error categorial. Para ello, se utiliza la filosofía de Gilbert Ryle como herramienta para explicar las razones que fundamentan estas acusaciones y para mostrar por qué, pese a que ciertas versiones del libertarismo que acuden a la causalidad de agentes o al dualismo cartesiano cometen estos errores, un libertarismo que busque en el indeterminismo fisicalista la base de la posibilidad de la (...) libertad humana no necesariamente puede ser acusado de incurrir en ellos. (shrink)

The incense used in some cults and oracles in antiquity seems to have possessed the power to induce visions and prophecies. a study of its components, from an ethnobotanical perspective, reveals us their psychoactive power.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC)Carlos SteelJohn M. Dillon. The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. x + 252. Cloth, $65.00.When Plato died, in 347 BC, he left behind not only the collection of philosophical dialogues we still read with admiration, but also a remarkable organization, the "Academy," wherein his students (...) continued the discussion he had initiated. Dillon's latest book is an attempt to recreate the intellectual climate in the Academy during the first generations after Plato's death, the "Old Academy," called thus to distinguish it from the "New Academy," which started with Arcesilaus in the mid 270's, who abandoned doctrinal speculations for a sceptical stance. Given the elusive nature of the dialogues, the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has been controversial from the beginning. Therefore, scholars always have been eager to know in which direction Plato's first successors—Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo—took the Academy; thus they hoped to find some justification for their own interpretation of Plato. Unfortunately, our information on the doctrines of Plato's first successors is scarce. Browsing through the fragments collected by scholars, one may be tempted to conclude that it is not such a great disaster that most texts of the Old Academy have been lost. For it seems that the Academy after Plato was leaning towards a rather esoteric metaphysical speculation about the first principles, which makes us lament on what has become of the philosophical heritage of Plato, a genius fallen into the hands of epigones. One gets the impression that the original and refreshing philosophical contributions came from outside the Academy, from the Lyceum founded by Aristotle and continued by Theophrastus, and later from Epicurus and Zeno and their new schools, which will dominate the Hellenistic period. This, however, is not the view of Dillon: "It will be the thesis of this book that Speusippus and Xenocrates set the agenda for what was to become, over the succeeding centuries, the intellectual tradition which we call Platonism" (v). Even early Stoicism is, in Dillon's view, a "development and formalization of contemporary Platonism" (235).In an introductory chapter Dillon discusses the location and juridical structure of the Academy and gives a general survey of the main doctrines of the school. The following three chapters present the lives, work and thought of the first heads of the Academy; a final chapter is devoted to some minor members of the early Academy. The book concludes with a short epilogue on Arcesilaus and the reasons for his turn to scepticism. Dillon is an [End Page 204] excellent writer who knows how to tease out and expound the most abstruse philosophical doctrines in a captivating way, mixing, as he does here, biographical anecdotes and witty comments with a sharp analysis of arguments and a speculative reconstruction of lost doctrines. I doubt, however, whether this book will become such a classic as his celebrated The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977).My first worry is anticipated by Dillon himself: "This is perforce a rather speculative book, and no doubt it will be criticized for that" (vii). Dillon defends himself against this critique: I have tried, he says, "to put the most favourable construction on the evidence available to us," his assumption being that the figures he is dealing with "were not philosophical imbeciles"(vii). My reservations are not about Dillon's attempt to construct a coherent doctrine using all relevant information on an author, but about his method of reconstruction, in particular his speculation and his preference for often questionable later material to fill the gaps in our information. "With a good deal of speculation, our exiguous information on Polemo's philosophical position can be fleshed out somewhat" (176). Thus, in his exposition of Speusippus's doctrine of the first principles, Dillon does not start from Aristotle, considering him too biased, but from chapter 4 of Iamblichus's treatise De communi mathematica scientia. In this Neo-Pythagorean treatise, Speusippus is not even mentioned. Even if there are arguments, as Dillon believes, to attribute the doctrine of Chapter 4 to Speusippus, one should... (shrink)

Desde el terreno de la filosofía como estilo de vida, y de la subjetividad social y la interpretación como quehacer investigativo, analizo primero los relatos autobiográficos en su relación con la acción social y sus sentidos, es decir, la subjetividad social. Luego, presento una reflexión sobre la reconstrucción de la experiencia personal durante el relato (y el papel que juega la memoria en dicho proceso), que culmina con la incorporación del mito, como forma de configurar la narración desde un saber (...) colectivo de gran plasticidad. Termino presentando la utilidad metodológica del relato de vida en una investigación de corte praxeológico. (shrink)

Discusses the nature of choice in terms of discovering God's will, tells how to face the fear of choosing, and looks at the role of compromise.

This volume is a study of the influence of Timaeus on the development of Western cosmology in three axial periods of European culture: Late Antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance.

This introductory book on the philosophy of the Renaissance constitutes the third volume of a History of Western Philosophy offered by OPUS General Editors. This volume was preceded by similar introductions to Classical Thought, the Rationalists, the Empiricists, and Continental Philosophy since 1750. It will be followed by two more volumes on English-Language Philosophy, the first from 1750 to 1945 and the second from 1945 to the present.

Averroès, musulman andalou du XIIe siècle, discute le " De anima " d'Aristote dans une approche rationalisante du rapport entre religion et philosophie, entre étude de la vérité révélée et surnaturelle, et étude démonstrative de l'univers. La béatitude spirituelle de l'homme est décrite dans le Coran. En philosophie, elle serait l'union de son intellect à l'intellect agent universel.

He also protected higher causes from responsibility by saying that evil may result from a combination of goods. Proclus objects: evil is real, and not the mere privation of form. Rather, it is a parasite feeding off good. Parasites have no proper cause, and higher beings are thus vindicated as being the causes only of the good off which evil feeds."--BOOK JACKET.

Una crítica a los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt, presentada por David Widerker y conocida como la "Defensa-W", ha persistido a través de los años como uno de los retos más difíciles que estos han de enfrentar. En este texto defiendo los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt de este ataque de Widerker presentando un dilema en el que su premisa fundamental, el Principio de expectativas alternativas, se ve envuelta: o bien la plausibilidad de este principio depende de la máxima kantiana "deber" implica "poder", lo cual haría (...) que el principio mismo, y con él todo el argumento de Widerker, sea redundante y prescindible; o bien no se basa en esta máxima, pero entonces no hay ninguna razón de fuerza por la cual se pudiera defender que este principio debe ser aceptado como válido. A critique presented by David Widerker on Frankfurt-counterexamples and known as the "W-defense" has persisted for years and has been considered one of the most difficult challenges these counterexamples have to face. This paper aims to defend Frankfurt counterexamples against Widerker's attack. For doing this, the paper presents a dilemma addressed to the main premise of Widerker's attack: The Principle of Alternative Expectations. The dilemma states: either this principle rests on the Kant's maxim, "ought" implies "can", and then this makes redundant and unnecessary the principle and Widerker's whole argument; or the principle does not rest on such maxim and then there is no good reason to accept it as valid. (shrink)

En su libro El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presenta una objeción a los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt según la cual lo que hace que una alternativa sea robusta o no es el contexto en el que se encuentra el agente; así, alternativas que, en principio, no se verían como robustas y eximentes, pueden llegar a serlo en circunstancias especiales y los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt presentan, justamente, este tipo de circunstancias. En este escrito presento tres objeciones al brillante argumento de (...) Moya. En primer lugar, defiendo que no es claro que la alternativa que él considera robusta esté cumpliendo el papel de soportar, al menos en parte, la atribución de culpa del agente. En segundo lugar, retomo la respuesta que Moya ha dado a una crítica de Pereboom quien lo acusa de presuponer en el seno de su argumento al principio de posibilidades alternativas y, por ende, de caer en una petición de principio. Defiendo que la respuesta que ha dado Moya no le permite eludir la crítica de Pereboom. Finalmente, ofrezco una consideración acerca de cómo podría desarticularse la propuesta de Moya si se logra presentar un contraejemplo tipo-Frankfurt de corte determinista. (shrink)

En el debate contemporáneo entre determinismo e indeterminismo, la mecánica cuántica es utilizada por los libertaristas como recurso para escapar al determi-nismo propuesto por la física clásica, y como búsqueda de un fundamento para la posibilidad de la libertad de la voluntad y de la responsabilidad moral. En el presente artículo se mostrará que toda defensa de la libertad que recurra a la mecánica cuántica ha de poder sortear al menos dos problemas: el que plantea el que he decidido llamar (...) el principio de escala, y el que resulta de lo que Robert Kane define como el principio de suerte. Se mostrará, además, que responder al primer problema no implica responder al segundo. Finalmente, a través de un análisis de las más recientes propuestas que desean sortear este último, se mostrará que ninguna de las propuestas ofrece una explicación convincente acerca de cómo la mecánica cuántica puede ayudar a resolver la cuestión de la libertad de la voluntad. Antes bien, parece que la mecánica cuántica contribuye a su complicación. (shrink)